Abstract-In this letter, by introducing the strategic decision making into the Chinese restaurant process, we propose a new game, called Chinese Restaurant Game, as a new general framework for analyzing the individual decision problem in a network with negative network externality. Our analysis shows that a balance in utilities among the customers in the game will eventually be achieved under the strategic decision making process. The equilibrium grouping is defined to describe the predicted outcome of the proposed game, which can be found by a simple algorithm. The simulation results confirm that the rational customers in Chinese restaurant game automatically achieve a balance in loading in order to reduce the impact from the negative network externality.
of them may use. This introduces the negative network externality into the problem. Another example is the deal selection problem on social networking website such as Groupon. Businesses which provide deals may receive overwhelming number of customers under the discounted deal. The overwhelming number of customers has a negative network externality on the quality of the products and therefore impairs the customers' experiences. In these examples, the negative network externality degrades the utility of the agents making the same decision. As a rational agent, one should take into account this degradation when making his decision. Note that such negative network externality exists in many different applications such as cloud computing and smart grid.
Chinese restaurant process is a non-parametric learning methods for unbounded number of objects in machine learning [6] . In Chinese restaurant process, we have a restaurant with infinite number of tables. Customers arrive the restaurant sequentially. When one customer enters, he either joins one of the tables which are already opened by other customers, or requests a new table. The probability of his decisions is related to the number of customers in each table. Generally, if a table is occupied by more customers, then a new customer is more likely to join the table, and the probability to open a new table is predetermined [7] . This process provides a systematic method to construct the parameters for modeling unknown distributions. Nevertheless, we find that Chinese restaurant process provides a proper structure to formulate the decision making problems in networks with negative externality, as previously mentioned.
By introducing the strategic behavior into the non-strategic Chinese restaurant process, we proposed Chinese Restaurant Game as a new model for social learning problems with network externality. Let us consider a Chinese restaurant with tables and rational customers. Each customer may request and be seated in any of the tables. We assume that customers prefer bigger dining space. Thus, they may prefer bigger tables. However, a customer may need to share the table with others if multiple customers request for the same table. In such a case, the customer's dining experience is impaired due to the reduced space, and the negative network externality plays a role here. Therefore, as a rational customer, one has to consider both the table size and the decisions of other customers when making his choice in tables. How rational customers make their decisions in such a game model is our main focus. In this letter, we will study the simultaneous Chinese restaurant game where customers make decisions simultaneously. The sequential Chinese restaurant game, which includes the social learning effect by letting customers make decisions sequentially, is discussed in [8] . , the customer will choose to share the larger table. Otherwise, the smaller table will be chosen. The result shows that even both customers have perfect knowledge about the true system state, i.e., which table is larger, they may not always choose the larger one in the equilibrium. Instead, the equilibrium depends on how severe the negative network externality is. If the network externality results in an unacceptable penalty, then customers should choose different tables to avoid it. Now let us consider the general scenario where there are customers and tables. The size of tables are given by , which are known by all customers. Since the customers are rational, their objectives in this game are to maximize their own utilities. However, since their utilities are determined by not only their own actions but also others', the customers' behaviors in the game are influenced by each other.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A strategy describes how a player will play given any possible situations in the game. In the Chinese restaurant game, the customer's strategy should be a mapping from other customers' table selections to his own selection. Recalling that is the number of customers choosing table . Let us denote with being the number of customers except customer choosing table . Then, a rational customer should choose the action as (1) The (1) describes a special set of strategy called best response, which represents the optimal action of a customer that maximizes the utility given other customers' actions. That is, given player 's action space and his utility function , where is player 's action and is the actions of all players except player , the best response of customer is .
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Nash equilibrium is a popular concept for predicting the outcome of a game with rational customers. Informally speaking, Nash equilibrium is an action profile, where each customer's action is the best response to other customers' actions in the profile. Since all customers use their best responses, none of them have the incentive to deviate from their actions. Formally speaking, considering a game with players . Each player has an action space and a utility function , where is the player's action and is the action profile of all players except player . Nash equilibrium is the action profile where .
A. Equilibrium Grouping
According to the definition of Nash equilibrium, the sufficient and necessary condition of Nash equilibrium in Chinese restaurant game is stated in the following theorem. 
If customer chooses any other table , i.e., , then his utility becomes (5) Since is a Nash equilibrium, we have . From Theorem 1, we can see that, at Nash equilibrium, one customer's utility would never become higher by deviating to another table. Moreover, any deviation to another table will degrade the utility of all customers in that table due to the negative network externality. The (2) also implies that customers may eventually have different utilities even the tables they choose have the same size. A simple example would be a three-customer restaurant with two tables in exact same size. Since there are three customers, at the Nash equilibrium, one of the table must be chosen by two customers while the other table is occupied only by one customer.
B. Uniqueness of Equilibrium Grouping
Obviously, if there is a Nash equilibrium in Chinese restaurant game, we can always exchange the actions of any two customers in one Nash equilibrium to build a new Nash equilibrium without violating the sufficient and necessary condition shown in (2) . Therefore, the Nash equilibrium is not unique. Nevertheless, the equilibrium grouping can be unique as stated in the following Theorem.
Theorem 2: If the inequality in (2) strictly holds for all , then the equilibrium grouping is unique. Proof: We will prove by contradiction that if the inequality in (2) Since is also an equilibrium grouping, we have (9) According to (7), (8) , and (9) we have which contradicts with (6). Therefore, the equilibrium grouping is unique when the inequality in (2) strictly holds. Notice that when the equilibrium grouping is not unique, there must exist some tables with equalities in (2) hold, which means that these tables become exchangeable since they offer the same expected utility in equilibrium. It will be sufficient, but not necessary to have all tables become exchangeable if all tables have the same size, which is the original assumption in Chinese restaurant process.
When the equilibrium grouping is given, the utilities of customers choosing each table are also determined. Therefore, the equilibrium grouping is sufficient to describe the final state of Chinese restaurant game when we are interested in the system efficiency instead of individual utility.
IV. ALGORITHM FOR FINDING EQUILIBRIUM GROUPING
We then show how the equilibrium grouping can be found through a greedy algorithm to construct one. In the original game, customers make their decisions simultaneously, which makes the outcome hard to predict. Nevertheless, the balance among tables can be easily observed by altering the game structure into a sequential game. In the proposed greedy algorithm, the customers choose their actions sequentially with customer being the customer choosing the action. We let customers choose their actions in the myopic way, i.e., they choose the tables that can maximize their current utilities purely based on what they have observed. Let with be the grouping observed by customer . Then, customer will choose the myopic action given by (10)
The proposed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Finding the Equilibrium Grouping
Input: # of customers , # of tables , where the last inequality comes from the fact that is a decreasing function in terms of .
Note that (12) holds for all with , i.e., . According to Theorem 1 and (12), the output action set from the proposed greedy algorithm is a Nash equilibrium. Since Algorithm 1 has only finite steps and always has outputs, the existence of Nash equilibrium is promised. Moreover, the corresponding grouping is an equilibrium grouping. Note that the complexity of Algorithm 1 is , which is quite efficient. Additionally, when the conditions in Theorem 2 hold, the output grouping is the unique equilibrium grouping in the proposed game.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We verify the proposed algorithm and evaluate the efficiency of equilibrium grouping in Chinese restaurant game through simulations. We consider a Chinese restaurant with 5 tables and 10 customers. The table sizes of these tables are randomly given as [5.1636, 84.1935, 40.1581, 38.0183, 73.4684] . The utility function is , which roughly represents the expected throughput in wireless networks if we take as the SINR while the interference caused by each user is 1. We first verify if the grouping derived through the proposed algorithm is the equilibrium grouping. We compare the utility under the grouping chosen by Algorithm 1 with the utilities under "one-customer change" scheme. In one-customer change scheme, the utility of customers in table is , which is the utility that a customer can obtain if he deviates from his original choice to table . The simulation results are shown in Fig. 1 . We observe that the utilities under one-customer change scheme are strictly lower than the utilities under the grouping . This confirms that all customers under the grouping have no incentive to deviate. Therefore, the grouping given by Algorithm 1 is the equilibrium grouping in Chinese restaurant game.
Next, we would like to evaluate the efficiency of the equilibrium grouping in Chinese restaurant game. We compare with two heuristic table assignment schemes: Round-Robin and Largest Table schemes. In Round-Robin scheme, customers are assigned with the table in a circular order. In Largest Table  scheme, all customers choose the largest table, which is table  2 in this simulation. The utility of each customer and the averages are shown in Fig. 2 . We observe that customers have balanced and generally higher utilities in Equilibrium Groping scheme, and the average utilities is highest in Equilibrium Grouping scheme among all three schemes. On the other hand, all customers in Largest Table scheme have the same utility  since they all share table 2 . However, the utility is quite low due to the severe negative network externality effect under this scheme. In Round-Robin scheme, customer 1 and 6 have very low utilities because they are assigned with table 1, which is the smallest table. As a result, the average utility of customers in Round-Robin scheme is lower than the one in Equilibrium Grouping. The equilibrium grouping from Chinese restaurant game indeed balances the loading of tables, under which the customers have the highest utilities on average.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new game, called Chinese Restaurant Game, by introducing the strategic game-theoretic analysis into non-strategic machine learning. The proposed Chinese restaurant game can provide a new general framework for analyzing the strategic behaviors of rational agents in problems with negative network externality such as dynamic spectrum access, deal selection on Groupon and cloud service selection. By analyzing this game, we observe that the equilibrium grouping is sufficient to describe the final state of the game. The sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium grouping are given, and a simple algorithm to derive the equilibrium grouping is proposed in this letter. The efficiency of the equilibrium grouping from Chinese restaurant game is verified through simulations. We conclude that rational customers under Chinese restaurant game automatically achieve a balance in loadings to avoid the severe negative network externality. As a result, customers have higher utilities, and the system efficiency is enhanced.
